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In this article I explore the metaphysical underpinnings of ‘Art and Objecthood’ in order to 
tease out its reliance on several of the tenets of conservative art criticism: Plato’s theory of 
forms, Kant’s aesthetics and the unquestioning acceptance of subjectivity and representation. 
I argue that it is due to these investments that ‘Art and Objecthood’ fails to come to terms 
with the condition of art in the age of advanced technology and virtual (simulated) reality. 
This argument develops by means of clarification of three key concepts: simulacrum, 
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What is the place of art criticism in the world today? The discipline that was once 
concerned with the evaluation of visual art according to rational principles, relied for its 
operations on notions of artistic genius and its eternal bedfellows: talent, perception, 
interpretation and speculation, yet these attributes can today only mask the complex 
phenomena that underpin art in the age of advanced technology, mass media and 
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(dis)information. Since Hegel’s influential Lectures on Aesthetics, academic art criticism 
(from kritēs – judge) embraced dialectical reasoning as the means for clarity and the explicit 
exposition of all the steps that lead towards a conclusion (Houlgate 2007). But implicitly art 
criticism feeds on the liberal fiction of universal communicability and transparency of 
thoughts and artworks. (Adorno 1966/1983) But for Theodor Adorno (1970/1997), for 
instance, the value of an artwork is not measured by how well it communicates, but on the 
contrary by how much it resists pre-given standards of judgement. In this view art is always 
an act of violence towards thought, truth and understanding, for no other reason than what art 
does is to rupture familiar, conventional forms of knowledge and power and their standard 
attributes: reason, negation, contradiction and lack  (Foucault 1996), making it possible to 
inhabit the sense of ‘something happening’ (Lyotard 1984). The question for art criticism 
then becomes not how to identify genius, but how to account for strategies of 
experimentation, curiosity, and doubt that are capable of creating meaningful perceptions out 
of random and accidental bits of matter  (Golding 2001). Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari 
(1980/2003) might say that the task of the art critic is to account for the way a plane of 
immanence is being built.  
 
Introduction 
In the opening lines of ‘Art and Objecthood’ Michael Fried (1998 p.148) says ‘The 
enterprise known variously as Minimal Art, ABC Art, Primary Structures and Specific 
Objects is largely ideological’. But the fact is that Fried did not write a critical essay about 
minimal art; his essay is itself a piece of ideology. How are we to understand this form of 
writing, that criticises the critical function of art? And more importantly, what are we to make 
of the sad fact that this text still casts a long shadow on art criticism today? It is neither a 
question of criticizing or correcting Fried, nor of ‘bringing up to date’, rather it is a question 
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of proceeding by way of identifying the dualist oppositions and the ideological investments 
that establish the ontological significance of this text.  
A number of scholars have already pointed out that ‘Art and Objecthood’ suffers from 
an amnesia of the effects of capitalism on art  (Grudin 2016) which, together with the self-
referentiality of Fried’s later work  (Wilson 2011) point towards an uncharitable reading of 
this text as in equal measure reactionary and narcissistic. However, in this article I will 
pursue another line of inquiry that questions the metaphysical foundations of Fried’s criticism 
that cause him to believe in universal values such as ‘conviction’, ‘absorption’ and 
‘authenticity’. For Fried is not criticising the work of certain artists, but devising a universal 
method for distinguishing true art from ‘objecthood’, based on the assumption that (Fried’s) 
consciousness can distinguish physical reality from art. The problem is that Fried’s essay was 
written in 1967, which situates it within the age of advanced technology, modern science 
(quantum physics, relativity), mass-information, multinational capitalism and media culture, 
in which reality is augmented by hyper-reality, and consciousness struggles to distinguish the 
real from the imaginary. The 20th century created new forms of materiality that challenged, 
and sometimes obliterated the traditional distinctions between cultural and natural artefacts, 
and between perceptual and analytical domains that sustained much of the discourse of 
aesthetics since Immanuel Kant. This inability of consciousness to grasp the distinction 
between the real and the imaginary, and the subsequent collapse of the aesthetic model that 
was built on this paradigm, is a key concern for 20th century art and philosophy, but it has no 
place in Fried’s ideas. As we shall see, this rejection leads him to adopt a conception of art 
that is hierarchical, analytical and traditionalist. Paradoxically, Fried’s attempt to grasp what 
‘works’ in a work of art by opposing authentic art to objecthood, not only distorts and 
sterilises the affective power of art, but also makes it into something stale and confined, in 
other words, it makes art into an object.  
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In what follows, I will show that explication of the role of Kantian dualism in the 
project of art criticism goes a long way towards clarifying the intentions and the 
commitments of Fried’s essay, which are, broadly defined, to defend the Platonic conception 
of the image against the threat of simulacra and its contemporary rendition, the readymade. 
Simply stated, Kant’s aesthetic theory posits an opposition between objective sensation that is 
conditioned by the a priori forms of space and time (Critique of Pure Reason) on the one 
hand, and on the other the subjective element of sensation (Critique of Judgement). The 
salient point for the discussion that will follow is that in order to maintain the division 
between ‘art’ and ‘objecthood’ Fried has to presuppose on the one hand the subjective 
identity of the self, and on the other, the objective identity of the art object, which this self is 
able to recognise. Fried’s idea of what constitutes ‘objecthood’ is dependent on establishing 
the subjectivity of the beholder which adheres to the prototypical representation of the 
Albertian frame. The notion of ‘authentic art’ (as opposed to objecthood) is established by the 
fiction of the beholder’s partial absence (‘absorption’), and the lack of an exclusive singular 
view point. Nevertheless, the experience of ‘authentic art’ is dependent on a discriminatory 
gaze, that focuses the eye of the spectator on one part of the field of view (the artwork) which 
can only be achieved by ignoring everything else that happens to be within the field of view 
and demanding visual attention. Correspondingly, the artwork as seen by the selective and a-
temporal gaze of the spectator becomes objectified, reified, fixated and deadened. (Nechvatal 
2001) So Fried’s notion of authentic art entails not the demolition of ‘objecthood’ but instead 
an assertion of a centring and selective gaze that legitimises certain viewing and political 
practices that cohere around the demand for objectivity, rigidity and hegemony. (Olkowski 
1999, p. 25) 
There will three points to consider: First, a remark on Plato’s theory of forms, and the 
distinction it implies between images (icons) and reality (ideas), and more to the point, how 
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an embrace of this form of metaphysics leads Fried towards a rejection of another kind of 
image, which Plato considers an illegitimate monstrosity: the phantasm (simulacra). If one 
teaches, as Fried does, that an artwork has to resist becoming a ready-made, one has to accept 
at the same time the impossibility of art that is capable of transforming the very concept of 
art, and emerging as something entirely new. Second consideration: a remark on theatricality. 
Fried’s own position is well known: he establishes a dialectic between seeing (absorption) 
and being shown (theatricality), in which ‘authentic art’ is meant to combat the tendency of 
the modernist artwork to dissolve into an object and become indistinguishable from it. 
‘Theatricality’ in this set-up becomes a universal touch-stone, applicable in equal measure to 
French classical painting, American modernism and even Roland Barthes’ Camera Lucida.  
(Fried 2005) However in this article I will pursue a different genealogy of theatricality, that 
traces its links with contemporary philosophical thought that studies theatricality as part of 
the logocentric apparatus inherited from the Renaissance. The third consideration concerns 
the condition of art in the age of advanced technology and information. If we are indeed 
inhabiting an age of post-truth, whether in its philosophical version as the end of grand 
narratives (Lyotard 1984) or in its terrifying form of post-Brexit UK and Trump USA, then a 
question has to be asked about the encounter with art as the visual manifestation of the 
victory of the unthinkable over the acceptable and the concomitant disintegration of the 
nation state amid the gig economies of stars of reality TV, corporate interests, cyber warfare, 
online bullying, racial prejudice, mass migration, armed militias, privatisation and food 
banks. In this social, political and technological context, contemporary art – in its dual 
manifestations as an investment vehicle for the elites and entertainment for the masses 
(Palmer 2016) – seems to offer access to forms of subjectivity that are more apt in inhabiting 
this post-truth world than logic and reason alone ever could.  
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Simulacrum and objecthood 
It is perhaps not a coincidence that the idea of simulacrum was reawakened in 
philosophy around the same time when minimalism made its claim on the body of 
contemporary art, as both have in common a rejection of universal value systems and ‘a 
paradigm shift toward postmodern practices’ (Foster 1996). The conception of ‘objecthood’ 
in contemporary art can be traced to Duchamp’s readymades which he created by selecting, 
modifying and rectifying mass-produced objects. In its various expressions, the culture of the 
readymade challenges the detachment necessary for the exercise of aesthetic judgements, 
which Duchamp associates with the ocular (retinal) traditions of modernist painting: ‘When 
you see what the Abstractionists have done since 1940, it’s worse than ever, optical. They’re 
really up to their necks in the retina!’  (Cabanne & Duchamp 1987). 
 In order to understand what this shift towards the readymade object entails and how it 
engenders a radical departure from the traditions and norms of earlier ages, we must turn to a 
brief history of the binary opposition between the real and the copy, as this opposition 
sustained much of the discourse in philosophy and in art criticism and practice at least since 
the Quattrocento. For despite the marked difference between the various schools and art 
movements (classicism, romanticism, impressionism, abstraction) they all share in the 
implicit acceptance of the image as that which stands over and against the real, whether by 
imitating it or by consciously rejecting visual resemblance.  
As is well known, this opposition between the image and the real has its roots in 
Platonism, where the sensible world is produced as a copy of the world of ideas, and it is the 
task of reason to overcome the errors of the copy in order to arrive at the truth. The greatest 
contrast is between εἰκών (eikon) and εἶδος (eidos), as the image (eikon) by necessity 
presupposes the notion of the other, of that which is different from the reality of the thing 
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(eidos). However, for Plato there is another distinction, between images that are able to point 
towards truth and images that are inherently deceitful: 
For example, we say that a painter can paint a cobbler, a carpenter, or any other craftsman, 
even though he knows nothing about these crafts. Nevertheless, if he is a good painter and 
displays his painting of a carpenter at a distance, he can deceive children and foolish people 
into thinking that it is truly a carpenter. (Plato 1997, p. 598c) 
 
In Aesthetics After Metaphysics, Miguel Beistegui (2012) comments that this kind of 
deceitful image lacks self-awareness of its own imageness, because being purely 
phenomenological (sensual) it seeks not to point towards some higher truth of an idea, but to 
replace it with a fake, without however, acknowledging the fakeness of the fake. Let us 
quickly clarify that Plato was not opposed to images as such (the fable of the cave is an image 
par excellence), but he seeks to drive a wedge between images that help us grasp higher truth 
and images that deceive the senses. The touchstone for this distinction is whether the image 
declares itself to be an image (the fable of the cave is told as a fable) or whether the image 
pretends not to be one, disguising itself as an object. Since Plato established his theory of 
forms, the history of art is to a large degree a history of attempting to hide or discredit the 
simulacrum, the forgery that has the appearance of an object, by privileging and celebrating 
only those images that declare their imageness outright and position themselves as copies of 
the real. This is not simply an aesthetic preference, for as Deleuze (1968/2004 p. 333) has 
pointed out in Difference and Repetition, Plato’s demand for ‘primary distinction’ between 
images and models is motivated by the moral need to protect the idea of truth from the 
dangerous world of simulacra. This is not only because simulacrum is a fake that threatens to 
undermine the truthfulness of all images, but because simulacrum undermines the idea of 
truth as such, relativising it and heralding the age of post-truth.  
Fried’s complaint against minimalism echoes Plato’s rebuke of simulacrum in ‘Book 
10’ of the Republic (597d-e), where poets and artists are barred from Plato’s ideal city 
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because their craft (technē) dupes the audience into thinking that it can bestow true 
knowledge while in fact it is nothing other than optical illusions. Simulacrum is the unlawful 
image, a counterfeit that pretends to be a true copy and hides its illegitimate origin by falsely 
claiming to belong to the order of the real, while in fact it is nothing more than trompe-l’oeil, 
mirage, phantom, spectre or ghost. Like Plato, Fried rallies against artists who refuse to 
transcend the real in order to arrive at a higher plane of ‘conviction’, content instead with 
imitation of objects, and activity that can be described as the construction of virtual reality. 
Theatricality for Fried is precisely the ‘theatricality of objecthood [and the] sheer persistence 
with which the experience presents itself’  (Fried 1998, pp. 159-60). What Fried describes as 
the ‘war… between the theatrical and the pictorial’ (ibid 160), is the conflict between art that 
transcends the real in order to arrive at higher form of truth and art that rejects the very idea 
of universal values such as ‘truth’ and ‘the real’. The artworks that Fried designates as 
‘theatrical’ seem to have a common denominator: they strive to take over the real, to immerse 
and to overwhelm us by replacing the real with a readymade, and truth with simulacrum until 
we are no longer able to distinguish the artwork from the real, the referent from the sign, and 
the subject from the object.  
According to Fried, only authentic art is immersive because it absorbs the onlooker 
rather than making her stand over against the artwork. Yet the readymade is also immersive: 
it immerses itself into the world, dissolving the boundary between the artwork and its 
environment. If subjectivity is at least partly formed through the knowledge of difference 
between images and things, as in Lacan’s (1953) mirror stage, then the erasure of the 
boundary between artworks and objects is bound to have an impact on the construction of 
subjectivity. This might mean that new modes of subjectivisation, and therefore new sets of 
values and new ways to make true propositions become available when the artwork does not 
function solely as an ‘image’. What if one was able to approach an entity ❉ without some 
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prior conception of its worth either as art or as an object. An encounter of this kind would 
register as something that ‘just happens’; an event of encountering without pre-given 
categories of function, form and aesthetic value. An encounter with ❉ would be 
experienced as an event of encountering, not because ❉ is imbued with meaning, but 
because the meaning is in the encounter itself. 
 
Theatricality and its discontents 
Fried (1998, p. 163) defines the task of art as the overthrow of theatricality, but what is 
meant by this, and more to the point, how can it be achieved? Theatre is understood by Fried 
in the triple sense as a) relationship with an audience, b) breakdown of the barrier between 
the arts and the world, and c) relinquishing questions of quality and value. The common 
thread to all three is that theatre introduces a distinction between things as they are and their 
representation on stage: a threshold or a dividing line that is required for the function of 
theatrical fiction to come into being. As Jean-François Lyotard (2004) has shown, the 
threshold is a pre-requisite for theatre’s ability to represent reality. There is no theatre without 
a clear and unambiguous distinction between the representation and the thing represented. It 
is this divide that for Fried constitutes the essence of theatricality. Yet, while Fried strives to 
rid art of all its traces, he does not seem to be able to rid his own discourse from the influence 
of the theatrical: ‘The crucial distinction that I am proposing is between work that is 
fundamentally theatrical and work that is not.’  (Fried 1998, p. 157) Distinction, as we have 
seen, is the essential feature of the theatre that makes it an enemy of art. Critical opposition to 
theatricality will not get one very far, as opposition itself is a theatrical requisite. Fried’s 
failure to escape the theatre by means of negation is not failure due to lack of trying but a 
 10 
reminder of the extent to which theatre and theory are mutually dependant. This is not only 
thanks to the shared root, θεωρία (theoria) designating both contemplation (as in theatre) and 
speculation (as in theory), but also because like the theatre, theory is born out of the deep-cut 
that establishes the truth of a proposition according to the logic of separation between two 
poles of experience: rational and sensual.  
This illusion of anti-theatricality, which for Fried is the requirement of ‘authentic art’ 
can only be sustained by clear and unambiguous separation between ‘authentic art’ and 
‘theatre’. Yet, this is exactly the same separation that is at work between the performance that 
is taking place on the stage, and the audience, or the beholder – who passively observes the 
play. This drawing of a threshold is repeated again in the further separation between the 
theatre stage and the backstage, where the theatrical special effects are concealed from the 
view of the audience and where the actors don their theatrical personae before stepping onto 
the stage. The theatre sustains yet another theoretical limit, between the theatre itself and the 
outside world – the street, the town, the state. Both theatre and theory impose a view that 
places the subject on the other side of a threshold from the object, encouraging us not to 
experience the world sensually, emotionally and physically but to stay over and above it, 
contemplating it at arm’s length.  
 There are two sides to the problem of theatricality. The first is the question of 
representation: theatre here means a method of division. It manifests a will to draw sharp, 
non-negotiable distinctions between the ‘real’ thing and its image. As Lyotard explains in 
Libidinal Economy theatrical representation rests on the model of Plato’s cave as the 
analytical, conceptual division between images and ideas: 
the Platonic division of the cave, which is effectively the theatrical division between a real outside and 
an inside simulating this outside […] The thing stands for something else, and it is less than what it 
represents. In order that it be what it is, there has been a lack of being. What is given to us, insofar as it 
is not similitude itself, is deficient in force. The theatricality of representation implies this deficiency, 
this depression. (Lyotard 2004, pp. 68,71)  
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Theatricality implies deficiency because in striving to represent the real by putting it on the 
stage, the theatre is obliged to divide the stage from the audience, as the theatrical illusion 
can be sustained only if the staged act is perceived as an ‘act’ by the audience that observes 
the play without participating in it. Fried’s own strategy is to show that ‘theater and 
theatricality are at war today […] with art as such’  (Fried 1998, p. 163) and that the 
imperative for modernist painting is to ‘defeat or suspend theatricality’(ibid 160, emphasis in 
the original).  
The picture Fried paints is of two ‘camps’ ‘at war’ (ibid 163), with each other, as the 
language of attack and defence (ibid 167) indicates, yet his attempt to mount an opposition to 
theatricality runs into a peculiar difficulty. The reason for this difficulty lies in the fact that 
‘attack’ and ‘defence’ are themselves theatrical terms, whether they refer to a real theatre of 
war or to a fake war on a theatre stage, in either case they imply a division between ‘us’ and 
‘them’, which is the condition of theatre.  
However - and this is the rub - once theatricality is understood as representation, it 
becomes quite clear that it cannot be overcome simply by means of opposition, antagonism or 
‘war’, because the only thing an opposition to the theatre can achieve is to re-create the 
conditions of the theatrical by re-establishing a deficiency that - as we have seen - is the 
precondition of the theatre itself.  
In contrast to the fundamental opposition to theatricality that is at the heart of Fried’s 
argument, Lyotard (and Antonin Artaud before him) has put forward the notion of pagan 
theatrics. This is a strategy for escaping theatricality not by means of negation but by way of 
placing the theatrical itself on stage. In Libidinal Economy Lyotard proposed that the role of 
the artist is to lay bare the mechanisms of theatrical representation, to show that if there is 
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anything real about representation, it is because there also exists a fully real virtual domain 
constructed not from objects and things, but from intensities, desires and surfaces:  
The representative chamber is an energetic dispositif. To describe it and to follow its 
functioning, that’s what needs to be done. No need to do a critique of metaphysics (or of 
political economy, which is the same thing), since critique presupposes and ceaselessly 
creates this very theatricality; rather be inside and forget it, that’s the position of the death 
drive, describe these foldings and gluings, these energetic vections that establish the 
theatrical cube with its six homogenous faces on the unique and heterogeneous surface. 
(Lyotard 2004, p. 3) 
Here the antinomy to the ‘theatrical cube’ is being revealed not as anti-theatricality, but as an 
infinite movement of surfaces that continuously self-replicate and morph into each other. Art 
here survives not because it ‘defeats theater’ (Fried 1998 p. 163) but because it replaces the 
logic of Platonic forms with the evolving symmetry of fractal geometry that stretches across 
electronic screens and other media devices to form what Lyotard calls The Great Ephemeral 
Skin. This is not because art here is rejecting a reference to reality, but because reality itself is 
understood as mass-produced object, and for that reason indefinitely signified, continuously 
recurring, subject to the logic of technology and the perpetual reformulation of commodities 
for new markets.  
The second aspect of theatricality is the mechanism of subjectivisation that relies on 
binary opposition for its function. Division situates subjectivity at the ground of the artistic 
experience, because theatricality appears to have a propensity to produce the subject through 
the doubling that is caused by negation and division. This is to say, the theatrical is 
thoroughly theoretical, optical and Oedipal model, attached to its past, to its phallocentric 
traditions and subjective invariants that produces its staged representations through division, 
castration and lack. Because theatricality is coached in terms of inside and outside, it 
institutes subjectivity - by way of the primary division of the world into dualist oppositions – 
as the ground of artistic experience.  
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Theatre’s greatest sin, Fried tells us, is dependence on the beholder: ‘[…] the situation 
itself belongs to the beholder - it is his situation.’ (Fried 1998, p. 154). The relationship of the 
beholder to the work of art within the theatrical schema is that of the passive onlooker facing 
an ‘object’. (ibid 155). If the origin of theatre is in negation, and if its operation is 
representational, then the deeper reason Fried can speak of a ‘war’ between theatricality and 
real art becomes clear. It is the old Platonic opposition between the sensible world and the 
world of ideas. Theatricality is the embodiment of the world of logic, reason and intellect. 
Fried says that theatrical works are merely interesting, while real works of art are convincing. 
Interest is a matter for the mind, while conviction is an experience of a different kind, more 
akin to a reverie. Anti-theatricality, in other words, implies that in order to be meaningful, 
accessible and ‘true’, the artwork has to inhabit some form of transcendental negation, or 
excluded middle or some other form of metaphysical ground. The difficulty is that this 
‘ground’ can only be established logically, rationally and dialectically. The weakness of 
Fried’s argument is not only that judgement is always already theatrical, as it proceeds along 
the lines of division, the same division that grounds the theatrical operation, but also that this 
‘ground’ can only be established logically, rationally and dialectically, by treating the 
artwork as a signifier. 
 The problem of theatricality is that negation – ipso facto – cannot itself be made 
visible via the theatrical set-up, and for that reason remains hidden. Whether via the Lacanian 
notion of lack, the Freudian notion of castration, or the semiological divide between the sign 
and the referent, theatrical negation is ultimately establishing a form of a binary logic. It is 
precisely this embracing of negation, rationality and division that prompts Antonin Artaud to 
diagnose Western Theatre as anti-theatrical. As Jacques Derrida (2001 p 296) outlines in ‘The 
Theatre of Cruelty and the Closure of Representation’, the source of the disease is in the 
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‘theological’ nature of the theatre, that elevates the author (and the critic) to the role of god 
and places him against the ‘passive, seated public’. 
So far, it might seem that Fried is arguing for the withdrawal of representation from art, 
as representation equates representation on stage. But the salient point about Fried’s thought 
is that by arguing against the dualism of theatricality and for the monism of ‘real’ art, he is 
unable to move beyond the very dualism he is trying to unsettle, as his thought is chained to 
the common-sense notion that representation is natural, ordinary, everyday occurrence. And 
this is only possible if representation is being detached from its connection to both ideology 
and subjectivity and re-appropriated as naturalised, normalised and sterile. Fried’s thought 
fails in its attempt to overcome theatricality because there is only one way to accomplish this 
task, and this is by means of theatricality itself. This is also why an art object can never stop 
being connected to its sacrificial, pagan roots. To claim, as Fried does, that there is a place 
where art can be free from the theatre, that there is a place that is prior to the beholder, to the 
staging, to the spectacle and the performance achieves nothing, for no matter how much one 
invokes presentness, conviction and instantaneousness it will still be impossible to deny that 
that there is any presence that is not from the start corrupted and eroded by representation, 
and this also means, by theatricality (Lacoue-Labarthe 1998, p. 117).  
 
Truth in Art 
Succinctly stated, Fried’s argument against minimalism (or as it was known in 1967, 
‘literalism’) is an argument for art that has revelation at its heart. For Fried, an artwork is a 
vehicle of spiritual transformation and inner conviction which seem to be at odds with 
sensual aspects of existence. In order to achieve this ideal, Fried has to bracket out all aspects 
of the artwork that could be seen to bear on its social, cultural and political relevance.  
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The experience that Fried describes as the opposite of theatre, explicitly relates to the 
practice of holy ecstasy, manifested through a spiritual revelation. It is a solitary experience 
in which the work of art acquires an iconic, religious force.  
It is this continuous and entire presentness, amounting, as it were, to the perpetual creation of itself, 
that one experiences as a kind of instantaneousness, as though if only one were infinitely more acute, a 
single infinitely brief instant would be long enough to see everything, to experience the world in all its 
depth and fullness, to be forever convinced by it. 
Compare if you will with St. Paul: 
In a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trump: for the trumpet shall sound, and the dead 
shall be raised incorruptible, and we shall be changed. ( Corinthians 15:52) 
 
The point is of course not only the stylistic parallels between the two texts, and the shared 
rejection of earthly life for the promise of a more enlightened ever-after (something that 
Freud might have called the death drive), but also the key idea that conviction, value, truth 
and everything else that constitutes the ‘human condition’ is grounded in a form of 
knowledge that receives its certainty ‘from outside’ so to speak, whether this ‘outside’ is the 
voice of god, as in the case of St. Paul, or if it is resides in an encounter with ‘authentic art’. 
In either case, this form of knowledge implies a change of belief and draws its authority and 
authenticity from on High. (Golding 2010) 
When ‘conviction’ is the criterion of art, what is being taken as the ground of this move 
is not only the mediation between the onlooker and the art object, but also an affinity between 
conviction and truth. The truth of something can only be determined if there is a meta-
discourse in which it is assumed that truth and conviction are not ‘on the surface’, that they 
are hidden and have to be uncovered. As a consequence, the authenticity of an artwork is 
linked to its truthfulness, that is to the conviction that the seeker experiences during spiritual 
revelation. Fried’s claim (1998 p 168) that ‘presentness is grace’ further reinforces the notion 
that truth is both the object and the means of art. The deeper structure of Fried’s argument is 
that true knowledge can transcend mere appearances and grasp their underlying presence. As 
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Luce Irigaray has shown, this framework is based on the notion of a stable subject that 
comprehends – like Rodin’s Thinker – a world that is also stable and unchanging.  
It becomes clearer what kind of art Fried considers as worthy of its name: art that 
escapes the theatricality of the representational image, instead immersing the viewer in an 
experience, the truth of which cannot be intellectually known but can be grasped directly and 
immediately. In this context, Fried’s description of his first encounter with Anthony Caro’s 
sculptures is indicative of the otherworldly power of these works:  
there was a gate, and as I stepped through it onto the courtyard beyond I found myself in the presence 
of two of Anthony Caro’s earliest abstract sculptures […]. I was alone with these for several minutes 
before Caro came out of the house. But that was long enough to experience the unshakable conviction 
that they were two of the most original and powerful sculptures I had ever seen […] it was thrilling to 
discover in myself so intense, spontaneous and convinced a response to work that I had come upon in 
this way  (Fried 1998, p. 7) . 
Everything in this passage points towards an experience of a mystical (or perhaps 
mythological) kind, burning bush meets conversion on the road to Damascus. The stepping 
through a gate, the finding oneself alone before the object of contemplation, the sudden and 
complete conviction in the truthfulness of the visionary experience and the spontaneous 
response to it, all these indicate that Fried describes something that transcends the everyday, 
and in so doing expresses the inexpressible. The main characteristic of this transcendence is 
that it constitutes an ex-stasis: a leap outside of time and outside of oneself. The reason that 
works of art like the sculptures of Caro are essentially authentic and anti-theatrical, is because 
they are extra-ordinary in the sense that they surpass the everyday. While theatrical works 
might entertain and help to pass the time, authentic art convinces the chosen few in its 
authenticity. This conviction is not for the faint-hearted: ‘those are hardly modes of 
seriousness in which most people feel at home, or that they even find tolerable’ (Fried 1998 p. 
155). 
 17 
What Fried has established is a rational-theological agenda for art criticism. To say that 
an artwork can give rise to conviction is to say that the forms, events and relationships within 
the artwork refer to objects, events and relationships contained in the mind of the viewer. 
Only if the universe is run on logical principles can it make sense to talk about a work of art 
as in itself convincing. 
As we have seen, theatricality is an alienating force that draws a line through the whole 
of experience, forever divorcing the play from the spectator, and analogically the sensual 
from the intellectual, and the mind from the body. Worse still, theatricality exposes a logical 
framework through which to view the world. In this lies, according to Fried, the greatest 
danger: under the auspice of theatre art loses it spiritual, sensual and theological dimension. 
When art is stripped of its mystical, spiritual powers, of its direct link with experience 
through the unmediated connection with life, all that remains is the theatre: a pale re-
enactment of the mysteries of the sacrificial ritual. 
It would be a mistake to think that the way to get out of ‘Art and Objecthood’ is by 
giving preferential treatment to the object, compensating its dismissal by Fried. Putting the 
object first will not work because the opposition between art and non-art is itself the product 
of an ideology that asserts that there is a real world that can be taken up and represented as an 
image. The strategy pursued by a number of post-modern artists is not to fight for inclusion in 
the ‘truth’, but to reject the meta-narrative of truth. This is not done by opposing truth – as 
opposition is yet another logical category – but by including the meta-narrative of truth 
within the artwork itself. Never before was simulacrum more important to the understanding 
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